El contexto inversor informal: especificidades del segmento de los business\ud
angels by Hoyos Iruarrizaga, Jon & Saiz Santos, María
© Investigaciones Regionales, 26 (2013) – Pages 179 to 198
Section artIcles
The informal investment context: specific issues 
concerned with business angels
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ABSTRACT: Informal investors play a key role to meet the financing needs 
of business projects in early stages. However, this is a group in which there are 
different kinds and ways of dealing with investment. One of these profiles is 
associated with the figure known as business angel, whose main distinguishing 
feature is its ability to add smart capital in the form of knowledge, experience 
and contacts. The aim of this paper is to determine to what extent the specific 
profile of business angels differ from the rest of informal investors. With a sam-
ple of over 800 informal investors in Spain, the empirical results of this study 
show that the higher income, skills and entrepreneurial training and the less fa-
mily ties to the entrepreneur, the greater the probability of belonging to business 
angel investment group.
JEL Classification: G29.
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El contexto inversor informal: especificidades del segmento de los business 
angels
RESUMEN: Los inversores informales desempeñan un papel fundamental para 
cubrir las necesidades de financiación de los proyectos de negocio en fase em-
prendedora. Sin embargo, se trata de un segmento en el que cohabitan distintas 
tipologías y maneras de afrontar la inversión. Uno de estos perfiles se asocia a 
la figura conocida como inversor ángel o business angel, cuyo principal rasgo 
diferenciador reside en su capacidad para aportar un capital inteligente en forma 
de conocimiento, experiencia y contactos. El objetivo de este trabajo persigue 
conocer en qué medida el perfil específico de los business angels difiere del resto 
de inversores informales. Con una muestra de más de 800 inversores informales 
en España, los resultados empíricos de este trabajo ponen de manifiesto que a 
mayor nivel de renta, mayores habilidades y formación específica para emprender 
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y menor vínculo familiar con el emprendedor, siendo mayor la probabilidad de 
pertenecer al segmento business angel de inversión informal.
Clasificación JEL: G29.
Palabras clave: inversión informal; business angels; actividad emprendedora.
1. Introduction
«Business angels» are becoming fundamental figures in efforts to close the eq-
uity gap encountered by start-ups at the outset of their projects (Harrison and Mason, 
1999; Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000). Once entrepreneurs have exhausted the 
funding available from the 3Fs (Family, Friends and Fools) that gap widens consider-
ably, to between € 100,000 and € 2 million. This bracket is relatively unattractive 
to venture capital funds, which tend to opt for more conservative investment policies 
(projects that have survived beyond the initial stages of their start-up) and increas-
ingly high minimum capital requirements for entry (OECD, 2011).
Business angels form part of the informal investment sector that can be found 
in all economies. However the financing market is highly heterogeneous, and the 
terms «informal investor» and «business angel» are not always synonymous (Av-
deitchikova et al., 2008): the latter not only provide capital but also engage actively 
withstart-ups 1 by supplying expertise, know-how, experience and facilitating access 
to their networks of contacts.
This study seeks to determine to what extent and in what aspects the socioeco-
nomic profile of business angels is significantly different from that of other informal 
investors in Spain. Specifically, an analysis is conducted to determine whether vari-
ables such as education level, income level and past entrepreneurial experience can 
be used to draw a significant distinction between different groups of informal inves-
tors (business angels and non business angels).
To that end a sample of over 800 informal investors in Spain is examined, located 
on the basis of data compiled by the GEM (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor) survey 
in 2010. From this group the GEM regional team for the Basque Country has ob-
tained a sub-sample of investors who meet the criteria for consideration as business 
angels, i. e. they provide capital and experience and become actively engaged in the 
projects that they finance.
This paper’s main contribution to the relevant literature lies in providing data to 
improve knowledge of the characteristics of informal financing markets, to which 
1 «Start-up» is a blanket term that covers numerous newly created undertakings and businesses in the 
early stages of development. According to the GEM (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor) project the «early 
stage» is the entrepreneurial stage od a business, which is deemed to cover its first 3.5 years of operation. 
A distinction must be drawn between start-ups and spin-offs: the latter are created to exploit and market 
technology or knowledge created by an organisation (corporate spin-offs) or by a university or research 
centre (academic spin-offs) (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004; Pirnay et al., 2003).
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little attention has been paid in the past by empirical literature. This may be partly 
because the investors involved keep a low profile and are hard to identify (Mason and 
Harrison, 2008).
The paper is presented in ten sections. Sections 2 and 4 review the relevant theory, 
seeking to clarify the nature and the peculiarities of informal investment and, more 
specifically, to analyse the important role played by business angels in financing 
start-ups. Section 4 outlines the hypotheses used in search of significant differences 
within the informal investment sector. Sections 5 and 6 then examine the methodol-
ogy applied and the statistical analyses conducted, and sections 7 and 8 present and 
discuss the results of those analyses. Finally, the main conclusions are outlined and 
some comments are provided concerning limitations and lines for future research.
2.  The concept of informal investment
Business angels form part of the informal investment sector that exists in all 
economies, which some authors refer to as the «informal venture capital market». 
However this market is highly heterogeneous and contains investors of various kinds 
(Politis, 2008). Indeed, the theoretical debate in the relevant branch of literature is 
still ongoing, and there is some uncertainty as to what definitions and terminology 
should be used (Avdeitchikova et al., 2008).
Mason and Harrison (2000, 137) define «informal investors» as «private indi-
viduals who make investments directly in unlisted companies in which they have no 
family connection». The main difference between this and the definition of a business 
angel is that it does not specify that the investors take an active part in the projects 
that they finance, so it does not envisage the transfer of smart capital that character-
ises «angel investments».
Nor does this definition of informal investors include persons close to the entre-
preneur who provide funds, e. g. relatives and friends. According to Mason and Har-
rison (2000) and Maula et al. (2005) the reasons why such people make contributions 
are different from those that prevail among professional investors, so they should not 
be counted strictly as informal investors. Moreover, since such funding is provided 
for reasons concerned exclusively with family ties and friendship, it does not meet 
the requirement of forming a market.
However not all the researchers in this field agree that this funding (such inves-
tors are also known as the 3Fs —Family, Friends and Fools— and their contributions 
as «love money») should be excluded. Indeed, there is currently a debate ongoing in 
the specialist literature as to whether they should be counted as part of the informal 
investment market (Avdeitchikova et al., 2008).
The GEM project, for instance, uses a broader definition of the term «informal in-
vestor» that includes the 3Fs. Reynolds et al. (2003) conclude that micro-investments 
from the 3Fs account for around 80% of the external resources required by start-ups, 
and are therefore relatively important enough to merit inclusion in the informal fi-
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nancing market. Erikson et al. (2003) introduce the concept of «family angels», i. e. 
persons who invest in projects to which they have family connections, and conclude 
that such angels tend to make their investments earlier and in less innovative busi-
nesses than other informal investors, and that they provide more patient capital.
Since we are aware of this lack of consensus as to what constitutes an informal 
investor (Avdeitchikova et al., 2008), we seek to provide an approach here that 
will help clarify the nature of this form of investment by distinguishing between 
business angels and other informal investors. To establish this distinction we take 
as our basis what we believe to be the single element on which there is complete 
academic and institutional consensus concerning what constitutes a business angel: 
the ability to bring not just capital but also knowledge and experience to investment 
projects.
This means that the main characteristic or feature identifying an informal inves-
tor as a business angel is his/her ability and willingness to provide smart capital in 
the form of business know-how, commercial expertise, experience or his/her own 
network of business contacts (Mason and Harrison, 1995; Aernoudt, 2005). It is pre-
cisely this added value that other informal investors lack.
We have decided not to use links between investors and entrepreneurs as a vari-
able by which investors can be distinguished from one another. In this study we relax 
the assumptions used in the definition given by Mason and Harrison (2008) 2, who 
assert that business angels do not maintain family links with the beneficiaries of their 
investments, and opt instead for a broader definition based solely on whether an in-
vestor provides projects with smart capital 3.
3.  Types of informal investment: business angels
As described above, a business angel is a private investor who provides start-ups 
with capital but also engages more or less actively in the development of the project 
funded, placing his/her network of contacts and experience at the disposal of the 
entrepreneur (De Clercq et al., 2006). Such investors sometimes work via networks 
(Christensen, 2011), the specific workings of which may be more or less profession-
alised (Maxwell et al., 2011).
Although it is hard to generalise (Mason and Harrison, 2000), the typical profile 
of a business angel seems to be an entrepreneur or business executive (either working 
2 Mason and Harrison (2008, 309) define a business angel as «a high net worth individual, acting 
alone or in a formal or informal syndicate, who invests his or her own money directly in an unquoted 
business in which there is no family connection and who, after making the investment, generally takes an 
active involvement in the business».
3 In line with the criterion followed here it makes no sense not to include as business angels investors 
who provide smart capital but also have ties through family or friendship with the entrepreneurs that they 
support. Direct observation, e. g. at talks and presentations given by business angels as part of networks 
or platforms, supports this contention: cases can be found of business angels who have supported projects 
led by members of their inner circle of friends or relatives.
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or retired) with a high net worth, experience in entrepreneurship and broad-ranging 
business expertise, who is willing to invest between 20,000 and 250,000 euros per 
project (Díaz et al., 2010).
The angel investment market is essentially local or regional in scope (Lengyel 
and Gulliford, 1997; Harrison et al., 2010), with angels favouring projects located 
close to home. They are willing to invest in a broad range of activities, includ-
ing the service sector, are capable of accepting long maturity periods and offer 
patient capital with more relaxed disinvestment calendars and more flexible exit 
stra tegies.
It is fundamental that the role of business angels be fostered and developed 
to cover the equity gap suffered by start-ups in their early stages (Harrison et al., 
2010). They are of key importance in that they occupy a critical position as provid-
ers of transitional funding when entrepreneurs have exhausted the sources of funds 
closest at hand, i. e. the 3Fs, but do not yet have a long enough track record to earn 
themselves access to venture capital or to bring in an industrial partner (see fig-
ure 1). This is why public institutions are showing increasing interest in developing 
networks to promote business angels as alternative sources of financing (Collewaert 
et al., 2010).
Figure 1. Business angels: range of investment and coverage of equity gap
Informal investment Formal investment
Family, Friends
and Fools (3Fs)
Seed stage Early stages Later stages
Business angels
Usual range of investment:
$25,000-500,000
Venture capital funds
Usual range of
investment: $2-5 million
Financing gap
Source: OECD (2011).
Moreover, the role of angel investors is revealed as even more important when 
trends in the venture capital market are taken into account. Changes can be observed 
in the profile of investors in young technology-based firms, with an increasing pres-
ence of the public sector and of informal investors, while venture capital concerns 
are tending to turn rather to investments in more mature projects, with larger volumes 
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of investment per operation (Fernández and Ubierna, 2011). The OECD (2011) es-
timates that in 2009 Business Angel Networks (BANs) in Europe mobilised more 
funding than venture capital operators and funds in regard to seed-stage projects (see 
Graph 1).
The major challenge facing the angel investment sector is to increase in size and 
raise the average volume of funds provided. There is a need to move towards formu-
lae involving syndicated funding by more than one business angel or joint investment 
operations with venture capital funds (OECD, 2011) if business angels aspire to cov-
er today’s increasingly wide equity gaps, which currently average between $500,000 
and $2 million (EBAN, 2010).
Graph 1. Business Angel Network (BAN) and venture capital seed investment 
in Europe 2005-2009. EUR millions
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Business angel network
VC seed
Source: OECD (2011) based on EBAN and EVCA data.
4.  Business angels and other informal investors: differences 
in profiles
This paper sets out to determine whether the socio-economic profile of business 
angels in Spain is significantly different from that of other informal investors. Busi-
ness angels contribute actively to the development of the companies in which they 
invest, so it is important to learn what their profile as investors looks like. To that 
end, we examine the variables of education level, entrepreneurial skills and expertise, 
entrepreneurial experience and net worth.
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4.1.  Education Level
Previous studies (Freear et al., 1994; Mason and Harrison, 2000; Wong and Ho, 
2007) confirm that the typical informal investor is an individual with a high or me-
dium-to-high level of education. According to GEM data for 2010, around 60% of 
such investors hold university-level qualifications (Güemes et al., 2010), a figure far 
higher than the percentage for the adult population as a whole in Spain 4.
Based on this evidence, this paper seeks to determine whether informal investors 
who match the profile for classification as business angels include a higher-than-av-
erage proportion of degree holders. Business angels are characterised in particular by 
not just providing financial support but also advice and actual assistance. Although 
such contributions depend on their management experience and their social capital 
and not necessarily on their level of education, we feel that the data available (more 
university graduates among informal investors) can serve as the basis for our first 
working hypothesis (H1):
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The fact that an investor holds a university-level qualifica-
tion increases the probability of his/her belonging to the business angel category of 
informal investors.
4.2.  Skills and Specific Training in Creating Start-ups
In line with the tenets of hypothesis 1 (H1), hypothesis 2 (H2) also examines 
the training and skills of investors. However, this time the objective is to determine 
whether there are significant differences between groups of investors in terms of 
specific entrepreneurial skills and expertise. According to the 2010 GEM report on 
Spain (Güemes et al., 2010), 78.6% of informal investors see themselves as holding 
the skills and expertise required for entrepreneurship, compared to a figure of 50.2% 
among the rest of the adult population of Spain. Our third hypothesis (H3) suggests 
that the figure is even higher among the specific group of business angels. Our second 
working hypothesis (H2) therefore looks like this:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): possession of the specific skills and expertise required to cre-
ate a start-up increases the probability of an informal investor belonging to the busi-
ness angel category.
4.3.  Entrepreneurial Experience
Theory-based literature sees business angels as investors with high levels of edu-
cation, entrepreneurial and business experience and a high level of financial culture, 
4 According to the report Overview of Education: OECD Indicators 2011 (Ministry of Education, 
2011), 30% of the adult population of Spain hold higher-education qualifications. 
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as required to make such investments (Freear et al., 1994; Mason and Harrison, 2000; 
Politis and Landström, 2002; Maula et al., 2005). Indeed, they tend to invest in busi-
ness sectors and technologies that they know well, which means that the level of 
value added that they can offer projects is high.
Some empirical research projects in this area have also concluded that business 
angels are currently or have in the past been entrepreneurs themselves, and that they 
have, in their careers, held posts concerned with the management and administration 
of new companies. This gives them broad experience in company start-ups (Freear 
et al., 1994; Mason and Harrison, 2000; Politis and Landström, 2002; Maula et al., 
2005).
Our initial hypothesis here is that business angels possess significantly greater 
entrepreneurial experience than other informal investors. To check this out, we ex-
amine the proportion of start-up entrepreneurs (involved in projects that have been 
running for less than 3.5 years) (H3a), of potential entrepreneurs (H3b), and of indi-
viduals who have been involved in the winding up of a company within the past year 
(H3c) in the group. These hypotheses are formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): the more entrepreneurial experience an informal investor has, 
the more likely he/she is to belong to the business angel category.
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): investors who at the same time also work as entrepreneurs 
on business projects that have been running for less than 3.5 years are more likely to 
belong to the business angel category of informal investors.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): informal investors who at the same time expect to start 
up entrepreneurial projects within the next three years (potential entrepreneurs) are 
more likely to belong to the business angel category of informal investors.
Hypothesis 3c (H3c): informal investors who have taken part in the winding up of 
a business project within the past year are more likely to belong to the business angel 
category of informal investors.
4.4.  Income Level
The likelihood of an individual acting as an informal investor seems initially to 
be positively correlated to his/her income level. The literature on entrepreneurship 
(Freear et al., 1994; Harrison and Mason, 1992) establishes that business angels have 
high net worth and income levels. However, empirical studies such as that of Maula 
et al. (2005) find no evidence for this. Here our initial hypothesis (H4) is that the in-
come levels of business angels are higher than those of other informal investors. This 
fourth hypothesis is formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): the higher the income level of an investor is, the more likely it 
is that he/she belongs to the business angel category.
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4.5.  Relationship between Investors and Entrepreneurs 
Pre-existing relationships between investors and entrepreneurs comprise another 
variable that we analyse here. Data from the 2010 GEM report for Spain (Güemes 
et al., 2010) reveal the prevalence of close links (family ties, friendship, working 
environment) between investors and entrepreneurs. As indicated above, we do not 
exclude from the business angel category those investors who provide capital and ex-
pertise for projects set up by entrepreneurs with whom they have family ties or links 
of friendship. However, we do seek to check whether such links are less frequent 
among business angels.
In this case the number of investors with a more professional profile may be ex-
pected to be greater. Indeed, business angels are tending to act increasingly through 
professional or more formal channels such as networks, forums or investment clubs, 
where they establish professional relationships with entrepreneurs with whom they 
are not initially connected by kinship or close proximity. The relevant hypothesis is 
formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 5 (H5): the more prior links they have with entrepreneurs based on 
family ties or friendship, the less likely informal investors are to belong to the busi-
ness angel category.
4.6.  Average Volume of Investment
Business angels act from a more professional viewpoint than other informal in-
vestors, investing in high-potential start-ups and weighing up and selecting their in-
vestment choices on the basis of stricter criteria. Their involvement in projects on a 
larger scale leads to hypothesis (H6), which posits that their average capital contribu-
tion is greater than the average contribution of other informal investors.
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The bigger the volume of capital provided, the more likely it is 
that an informal investor belongs to the business angel category.
5. Method
The data used are those gathered by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 5 
(GEM) project for the adult population (aged over 18 and under 65) of the whole of 
Spain between April and June 2010. The questionnaire used is the same one used in 
the GEM method, which is common to all the countries and regions where the project 
is implemented. The CATI (Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing) software 
program was used to ensure that interviews were properly conducted, recorded and 
encoded. The technical data file for the sample is presented in table 1.
5 For more information on the project see www.gemconsortium.org.
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Table 1. Technical data file for the GEM survey on the population aged 18-64 
Universe 30,741,514 people aged between 18 and 64 living in Spain.
Sample 26,388 individuals aged between 18 and 64.
Sample selection
Multi-stage sampling: random selection of cities and municipalities in 
provinces depending on the scope and population quotas resident in mu-
nicipalities with more than 5000 residents (urban population) and less than 
5000 residents (rural population).
In stage two, telephone numbers for each municipality were obtained at 
random.
Finally, individuals aged between 18 and 64 were selected, with quotas 
for each sex and age-group proportional to the population of each regional 
autonomous community.
Method CATI (Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing).
Sample error (+/–) +/– 0.6% a priori and +/– 0.24% a posteriori.
Confidence level 95%
Survey period April-July 2009.
(1) Source: US Census 2010, based on INE data.
(2)  The sample error was calculated for infinite populations. 
Hypothesis: P = Q = 50% or maximum indeterminacy.
Among many other issues, the GEM survey enables Spain’s informal investors 
to be identified. An «informal investor» is defined as an adult (aged 18-64) who has 
invested his/her own money in a business run by others in the past three years 6. 
Extrapolating the answers to the question of whether respondents considered them-
selves to match this definition, 3.2% of the adult population of Spain can be said to 
fall within this category. This gives us a sample of 854 informal investors here.
Secondly, since that this study was undertaken to identify those members of 
the overall group of informal investors who fitted the profile for consideration as 
business angels, the GEM research team in the Basque Country incorporated into 
the standard questionnaire a set of specific questions aimed at doing just that. Ac-
cordingly, persons already identified as informal investors (3.2% of the population 
aged between 18 and 64) were asked whether they provided management or entre-
preneurial experience and expertise for the start-ups that they financed as well as 
capital.
35.7% of the respondents identified as informal investors answered yes to this 
question. This can be taken as showing that almost four out of ten informal inves-
tors in Spain can be considered as business angels in the sense that they claim to 
provide smart capital to the start-ups in which they invest. The remaining 63%, i. e. 
the majority, provide only financial support for start-upsand do not involve them-
selves actively or provide assessment based on their own professional experience 
or expertise. This is the position typically held by those who fall into the category 
of the 3Fs.
6 This excludes investment in bonds, shares and investment funds.
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6.  Variables and statistical method
The working hypotheses drawn up are checked out using logistic regression anal-
ysis, also known as «logit analysis», a statistical procedure that has proved especially 
useful in cases where the presence or absence of a characteristic or result is to be 
predicted according to the figures obtained for a number of forecast variables. Its 
use is appropriate here since it provides a number of coefficients or weightings for 
independent variables that highlight the ability of each one to distinguish between 
the groups established in accordance with the dependent variable (business angels 
vs. non business angels).
The forecast of whether an individual belongs to one group or the other is based 
on the likelihood of an event occurring. The function obtained in the regression thus 
provides a value or forecast probability of between zero and one in each case, ena-
bling cases to be allocated to one group or the other 7. The regression coefficients of 
the independent variables here were obtained with the input method, comprising the 
inputting of all the specific variables in the model in a single operation 8.
The dependent variable is encoded as follows: 1 = informal investors considered 
to be business angels and 0 = the rest. The independent dummy and metric variables 
cover the various points to be analysed: education level (higher education), entrepre-
neurial experience, specific training for the creation of start-ups, relationship between 
investors and entrepreneurs, income level 9 and volume of investment. The encoding 
of all the variables analysed is shown in table 2. In the case of entrepreneurial experi-
ence several variables are used: firstly the TEA 10 indicator, which in this study meas-
ures the percentage of investors who are also involved as entrepreneurs in business 
projects that have been running for less than 42 months (TEA variable); secondly 
those investors who state that they intend to start up new businesses within the next 
three years (EXPECT variable); and thirdly those informal investors who have been 
involved in the winding up or closing down of a business undertaking in the past year 
(CLOSE-DOWN variable).
Two variables are used in regard to specific training in the creation of start-ups: 
the first is an objective variable (SKILLS2) that establishes whether an informal in-
vestor has received specific training related to the creation of start-ups at any time in 
7 To this end a cut-off point for the logistic function needs to be set, above which cases are allocated 
to one group and below which they are allocated to the other (Pérez, 2005). In this study the cut-off point 
used is 0.5. This is the default setting in most statistics packages, including SPSS.
8 Correlation analysis of the full set of independent variables specified in the model shows no sig-
nificant link between them. This ensures that there will be no multi-collinearity problems in the regression 
analysis.
9 The INCOME variable is expressed in ordinal form on a scale of 1-7: 1 = up to € 10,000; 
2 = € 10,001 - € 20,000; 3 = € 20,001 - € 30,000; 4 = € 30,001 - € 40,000; 5 = € 40,001 - € 60,000; 
6 = € 60,001 - 100,000; and 7 = over € 100,000.
10 The GEM project calculates the TEA (Total Entrepreneurial Activity) index as the percentage of 
the adult population (aged 18-64) involved in creating business undertakings that have been running for 
3.5 years or less.
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his/her life. The second is a subjective variable (SKILLS1) based on the investor’s 
perception of whether he/she has the expertise and skills required to start up a busi-
ness undertaking.
7.  Results of analyses
The model reveals statistical significance in rejecting the null hypothesis based 
on the ratio of verisimilitude test (Sig = 0.000), which seems to indicate a better fit 
once the independent variables are incorporated into the model. On the other hand 
the lack of significance of the Hosmer-Lomeshow test (Sig = 0.642) means that the 
null hypothesis of no significant differences between observed and predicted classifi-
Table 2. Independent & dependent variables of the analysis. Encoding
Independent variables
Variable Label Values
EDUC_LEVEL 1 if the investor has a university-level qualification0 otherwise
TEA
1 if the investor is also an entrepreneur in a business that has been running for 
less than 3.5 years.
0 otherwise
EXPECT
1 if the investor expects to start up a new business within the next three 
years.
0 otherwise
CLOSE-DOWN
1 if the investor has wound up a business undertaking (including self-employ-
ment) in the past 12 months.
0 otherwise
SKILLS1
1 if the investor considers him/herself to possess the skills and expertise need-
ed to be an entrepreneur.
0 otherwise
SKILLS2
1 if the investor declares him/herself to have received specific training in start-
ing up new businesses.
0 otherwise
RELAT_
1 if there is no prior link between the investor and the beneficiary of the funds, 
or if there is a purely professional or work-related link.
0 if there is a link based on family ties or friendship between the investor and 
the beneficiary of the funds.
INCOME Average annual income of the investor.
INVEST_VOL Average amount (in euros) invested in the business undertakings that they 
support as investors. 
Dependent variable 
BUSANGEL
1 if the informal investor matches the profile for consideration as a business 
angel.
0 for other informal investors.
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cations can be accepted: this confirms that the model specified fits the data correctly 
(see table 4).
Table 3. Variables analysed: descriptive statistics
Business angel-type investors
(n = 305)
Other informal investors
(n = 538)
Mean St. Deviation Mean St. Deviation
EDUC_LEVEL 0.49 (0.501) 0.41 (0.492)
TEA 0.12 (0.326) 0.07 (0.250)
EXPECT 0.23 (0.420) 0,19 (0.391)
CLOSE-DOWN 0.10 (0.299) 0,05 (0.225)
SKILLS1 0.87 (0.366) 0.64 (0.440)
SKILLS2 0.55 (0.499) 0.39 (0.488)
RELAT_ 0.21 (0.406) 0,08 (0.274)
INCOME 3.78 (1.552) 3.30 (1.476)
INVEST_VOL 338,255.64 (3836806.18) 26,042.47 (193,148.51)
Table 4. Logistic regression: results for the model
Business Angel vs. Non-Business Angel
Regressor variables B SD Wald Gl Sig. Exp(b)
EDUC_LEVEL –0,286 0,211 1,843 1 0,175 1,331
TEA –0,261 0,356 0,536 1 0,464 0,770
EXPECT –0,226 0,253 0,797 1 0,372 1,253
CLOSE-DOWN –0,401 0,429 0,877 1 0,349 1,494
SKILLS1 0,830*** 0,267 9,645 1 0,002 2,293
SKILLS2 0,359*** 0,210 2,919 1 0,088 1,432
RELAT_ 1,162*** 0,314 13,706 1 0,000 3,198
INCOME 0,121*** 0,068 3,175 1 0,075 1,129
INVEST_VOL 0,000 0,000 0,090 1 0,764 1,000
Constant –2,315 0,419 30,470 1 0,000 0,099
Valid N = 466
Nagelkerke’s R2 = 0.114
–2Log of verisimilitude = 589.317              Chi-square = 42.305          gl = 9                Sig = 0.000
Hosmer & Lomeshow test                           Chi-square = 5.871            gl = 8                Sig = 0.662
* p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01.
Table 4 also shows the results of the logit regression model, in which it can be 
seen that some of the regressor variables identified have a significant influence on 
whether investors match the business angel profile. The estimated coefficient (b), the 
standard deviation of b (SD), Wald’s statistic, the degrees of freedom (g), the sig-
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nificance of the estimated coefficient (Sig.) and the odds ratio [Exp(b)] are obtained 
for each of the variables included in the model. The descriptive statistics (mean and 
standard deviation) of the various variables are shown in table 3.
To judge from Wald’s statistic, the only significant regression coefficients are 
those that correspond to variables concerned with income level (p < 0.1), the type of 
relationship between investors and entrepreneurs (p < 0.01) and specific training in 
creating start-ups (p < 0.01; p < 0.1).
The higher the available income (INCOME) of an investor is, the more likely 
it is that he/she will be a business angel (Sig = 0.075). With a positive b coeffi-
cient (0.121) and an exponential value of b in excess of 1 (e0.121 = 1.129), it is found 
that business angels have higher annual incomes than the «other informal investors» 
group (for p > 0.1).
The type of relationship between investors and entrepreneurs (RELAT_) also 
proves to be significant, this time at the 1% level. With a positive b coefficient of 
1.162 and an exponential value of b of 3.198 (> 1), it can be stated that when there are 
family ties or links of friendship between the investor and the entrepreneur the inves-
tor is more likely to belong to the «non business angels» group. However if there is a 
professional link or if there is no a priori kinship link between the parties the investor 
is much more likely to be a business angel.
Another significant relationship is found in regard to the possession of the skills 
required to create a start-up (SKILLS1 and SKILLS2 variables). Business angels 
claim to have higher levels of the knowledge and human capital required to be en-
trepreneurs (SKILLS1), and to have received more specific training in this regard 
(SKILLS2), based on the values of their b (0.830 and 0.359) and on their odds ratios 
in excess of one (2.293 and 1.492).
However, no significant link is observed (p > 0.1) in the cases of the following 
regressor variables included in the model: education level (EDUC_LEVEL variable), 
entrepreneurial experience (TEA, EXPECT and CLOSE-DOWN variables) and aver-
age volume of investment per project (INVEST_VOL variable).
To check the predictive ability of the model its accuracy rate must be tested by 
comparing the observed data from the sample with the predictions made. The confu-
sion matrix or classification table shown in table 5 reveals that the model correctly 
classifies 22.6% of the informal investors with business angel profiles and 93.3% of 
non business angels. In overall terms this works out to 68.6% accuracy over the total 
number of original cases.
Huberty’s test (e) was the performed to check whether this accuracy level is greater 
than the number of cases that would be correctly classified at random. This resulted in a 
Z* statistic value, which was distributed as a normal distribution. For a 5% significance 
level a Z* statistic value of 14.14 was obtained (so the null hypothesis is rejected) 11, so 
11 Ho: The number of cases correctly classified by the model does not differ from the classification 
expected due to the effects of random chance.
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it can be stated that the accuracy rate provided by the model is significantly greater than 
would be obtained at random (see table 5).
Table 5. Results of the classification
Observed
Forecast
Do investors provide expertise & experience  
and involve themselves actively in the start-up  
that they fund?
Yes = Business 
Angel
No = Other 
informal  
investors
% correct
Do investors provide ex-
pertise & experience and 
involve themselves ac-
tively in the start-up that 
they fund?
Yes = Business 
Angel
38 132 22.6%
No = Other 
informal  
investors
21 296 93.3%
Overall percentage 68.6%
Huberty’s test (e)
e = (1/487) * (1702 + 3172) = 265,68 Z* ( , . )
, ( , )
= − ⋅
⋅ −
=334 265 68 87 487
265 68 487 265 68
6, ,22 1 96>
8.  Discussion of results
Our analysis of this logistic regression covers a number of independent vari-
ables or regressors and reveals how they affect the dichotomous dependent variable 
(1 = Business angel; 0 = Other informal investors). Our findings confirm that: i) the 
fewer links of kinship or friendship an investor has with the entrepreneur; ii) the 
higher his/her income level is: and iii) the more expertise and skills he/she has in 
regard to creating a start-up, the more likely he/she is to have a business-angel-type 
investor profile.
These findings confirm our hypotheses 2, 4 and 5. Unlike other informal inves-
tors, business angels are willing to bring money, time and experience to start-ups with 
high growth potential. The confirmation of hypothesis 2 corroborates the idea that 
the transfer of knowledge is based also on higher qualifications and more skills than 
other informal investors. This can be deduced from the finding that business angels 
are more endowed with the specific skills required for entrepreneurship and have 
more specific training in areas related to business start-ups.
The confirmation of hypothesis 4 shows that informal investors with higher in-
come levels are more likely to belong to the business angel category. Mason and 
Harrison (2008) define angel investors as individuals with high purchasing power. 
They tend to operate portfolios of between two and five investment projects, though 
the high risks involved mean that they do not usually invest more than 10%-15% of 
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their net worth (Mason, 2006). However no significant differences can be observed in 
the average amount invested per project (which means that hypothesis 6 is rejected). 
This means that in Spain it cannot be said that business angels typically provide sig-
nificantly more funding than other informal investors 12.
Funds linked to the 3Fs are highly important in funding start-ups. Once self fi-
nancing (funds provided by the promoting team themselves) is exhausted the first 
external resources resorted to by entrepreneurs are usually those of their inner circle 
of personal friends and family. This is proximity financing, in which closeness to and 
prior confidence in a person are the sole guarantee or collateral demanded. However, 
business angels are associated by definition with investments made on the basis of 
more professional criteria, and although the capital that they provide is patient (flex-
ible in terms of return rates and disinvestment schedules) it is also demanding in that 
it seeks high-quality projects with the potential for future growth.
The confirmation of hypothesis 5 bears out in part the contention that business 
angels are more rigorous and professional than other informal investors. This is dem-
onstrated by the fact that they are found to invest less in projects run by people with 
whom they are linked by kinship or friendship. Logically, this means that the pro-
portion of operations in which they have no prior proximity-based links with the 
entrepreneurs is greater: the investor/entrepreneur relationship is based rather on the 
professional setting of each project and its attractiveness as an investment opportu-
nity in the relevant market.
As expected, it is therefore confirmed that investors who do not contribute ex-
pertise or experience to the projects that they finance (non business angels) mostly 
have ties of kinship or friendship with the entrepreneurs that they support. In other 
words, there is significantly less transfer of smart capital when investors belong to 
the category of the 3Fs.
In any event it must be pointed out that asymmetry of information sources makes 
it very difficult for investors and entrepreneurs to find each other, so it is not easy for 
investors to find attractive investment opportunities outside their immediate circle. 
However, more and more business angels are beginning to operate via platforms, 
networks or investment clubs that provide a way of accessing high-quality projects 
with high future growth potential outside their area of influence.
9. Conclusions
Business angels are individuals who invest their own money in start-ups and 
make an active contribution to the deployment of the relevant businesses by provid-
ing expertise, know-how, experience and their own networks of contacts. The main 
12 However, although the difference is not statistically significant, descriptive data reveal that the 
average investment made by business angels (€ 12,000) is higher than the average amount invested by the 
rest of the informal investment sector (€ 6,000).
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advantage for entrepreneurs is that they invest at risk, with no demand for guarantees, 
and at the same time there is a transfer of «smart capital».
Business angels operate within the so-called «informal» venture capital market, 
a market characterised by its extreme heterogeneity. However, to date there has been 
little research into what profile or type of person is willing to invest his/her own 
wealth in businesses at the start-up stage.
A priori it seems clear that business angels represent a specific type of private 
investment. Their specific characteristics lead them to make contributions very dif-
ferent from the «proximity financing» provided by the 3Fs: they provide projects not 
only with funding but also with expertise, contacts, confidence and credibility in the 
eyes of third parties.
The findings of this study reveal that business angels tend to have higher in-
come levels than other informal investors, and possess more skills relevant to creating 
start-ups. This is a positive finding in that it shows that the knowledge transferred to 
entrepreneurs is based on higher qualifications and skills on the part of investors. In 
other words, such investors are better trained, have more purchasing power and may 
be expected to base their decisions on more professional criteria.
It is essential for the figure of the business angel to be developed if the equity 
gap affecting start-ups at the outset of their projects is to be closed. This equity gap is 
especially difficult to bridge because the funding bracket involved is unattractive to 
venture capital funds, which generally prefer more conservative investment policies 
(less involved with early stage start-ups) and larger capital amounts.
The business angel market is subject to asymmetries of information, specific 
demand-related problems and limitations in its environment that affect its efficiency 
and its operation. There is therefore a need to set up networks that can help over-
come some of these problems by providing a mechanism for matching investors with 
projects and acting as a preliminary filter to enable each investor to select the projects 
best suited to his/her interests. Such networks can also foster the training and prepa-
ration of entrepreneurs and investors and promote the development of programmes 
and seminars to increase public awareness of this type of financing.
Another important challenge for the business angel market lies in professionalis-
ing itself and increasing the volume of funding provided per operation. In this context 
syndicated and joint investment by more than one private investor may provide an 
innovative formula worth developing. This would also enable inexperienced business 
angels to work alongside more experienced investors, thus reducing risk levels in 
operations and giving rise to a learning effect that would also help professionalise the 
sector. Similarly, mixed operations by business angels and venture capital funds or 
subordinated public-sector loans would also help increase the coverage of the equity 
gap encountered in the early stages of start-ups.
Even so, it is clear that the business angel has become a figure of undoubted 
importance in the funding of entrepreneurial processes. This idea is supported by the 
fact that numerous public institutions have set up initiatives to support and encourage 
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business angels (networks, tax incentives, etc.). Moreover, in with current financial 
crisis banks have placed major constraints on lending, especially to start-ups, so an-
gel financing may be the only way of securing funds to set up new projects.
10.  Limitations and future research lines
The main limitation of this study lies in the sample selected. In accordance with 
the data used, and in line with the methods of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM) project, the sample of informal investors and the subsample of business an-
gels are obtained from the percentage of the adult population aged between 18 and 64 
who have invested money in business operations run by others in the past three years. 
However, the facts show that business angels are frequently experienced profession-
als with entrepreneurial backgrounds who are now retired. Accordingly, failing to 
take 65 to 75-year-olds into account means excluding the significant proportion of 
business angels who are aged over 64.
To facilitate future research, further studies are required to clarify the heteroge-
neity of informal venture capital markets and analyse the idiosyncrasies of this type 
of investment. Specifically, it would be useful to study the behaviour of business-
angel type investors, because their contributions in the form of smart capital (money 
+ knowledge) make them key figures in helping entrepreneurs to bridge the equity 
gap and make up the shortfall in resources and skills from which they tend to suf-
fer. Moreover, little is known about how entrepreneurs and investors first establish 
contact with each other, about what characteristics business angels rate highly when 
deciding whether to support a particular project or about the type of knowledge that 
they transfer to the start-ups that they support.
Future research could also examine the influence of the business environment it-
self in helping or hindering the development of informal venture capital markets. An 
analysis broken down by countries or regions would incorporate territorial variables 
and enable their influence to be measured in this regard.
Finally, the influence of the network effect could also be investigated: it would 
be worth analysing whether the intermediation of groups or BANs (Business Angel 
Networks) has any significant influence on the behaviour of investors in terms of 
project selection and post-investment contributions, or on the investment readiness of 
the entrepreneurs who resort to such platforms.
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